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I. Non-take-up: Definition and implications 
 
 This presentation looks at the phenomena of take-up and non-take-up of the public 
offer as criteria for evaluating public sector reforms aimed at facilitating citizens’ access to 
the rights and services to which they are entitled. We first define non-take-up (NTU), then 
examine its causes, and finally consider how public authorities can attempt to counter this 
phenomenon that challenges both the functioning of government administration and the 
relevance of the public offer for citizens. 
Originally the study of non-take-up directly concerned financial social benefits. That is 
why the initial definition related non-take-up to any individual eligible for a [financial] social 
benefit and who – for whatever reason – does not receive it. The introduction of the theme of 
non-take-up has different origins, depending on the country, but everywhere the question of 
NTU serves to make more explicit and operational the managerial concern with the 
effectiveness of the financial benefits offer (expected impacts / real impacts). In general, the 
attention paid to this issue is related to the constant need to know whether the offer does 
indeed reach those populations for which it is intended.  
 Numerous studies have calculated the rates of NTU of various social measures and 
programmes, in the fields of healthcare (social insurance, primary care services, mental health 
services), housing, training, professional insertion, financial social benefits, services to 
individuals, child care, etc. Very few compilations exist, and those that do are necessarily 
partial. They are limited to social protection or insurance, and to assistance (for France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Spain and Greece: EXNOTA 2005) or to a specific 
geographical region (for Canada: RDHCC 2009). These scant data show that the rate of NTU 
is situated in a very wide range of 0% to 90%, with an average of under 40% (see Annexes). 
This approximate result confirms the analysis of Hernanz, Malherbet and Pellizzari (2004) 
who, for various OECD countries, calculated a mean rate of NTU that oscillates between 20% 
and 40%, depending on the area of intervention. 
 Taking into account earlier studies in France, ODENORE (Observatory for NTU of 
rights and services) presented an explanatory typology comprising three main forms of NTU: 
  1) NTU due to no knowledge, when the offer is not known 
  2) NTU due to no demand, when the offer is known but not requested   
  3) NTU due to no reception, when the offer is known and requested but not obtained. 
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In this paper we present a series of typical explanations for each of these three forms 
of NTU. These are then used to build a model for dynamic analysis, based on the combination 
of explanations found in this domain. This typology proposes a general analytical framework 
that is applicable to all situations of NTU1.  
 
Explanatory typology of NTU 
(ODENORE, 2010) 
 
 
Form 1:  
No knowledge 
 
An eligible person is in a situation of NTU due to:  
o lack of information on its existence or on how to access it  
o no proposal made by the service provider 
 
 
Form 2:  
No demand 
 
An eligible and informed person is in a situation of NTU because he/she has chosen not 
to request the benefit, due to: 
o disagreement with the principle of the offer 
o various interests 
o lack of interest in the offer (cost/benefit) 
o lack of self-esteem 
o alternatives 
 
or because of a constraint due to: 
o discouragement related to the complexity of access 
o difficulties of accessibility (distance, mobility) 
o denigration of person’s own eligibility, chances or abilities 
o financial reasons 
o difficulty in expression his/her needs 
o fear of induced effects  
o fear of stigmatization 
o feeling of discrimination  
o denigration of own abilities 
o loss of the idea of having (a right to) rights 
 
 
Form 3:  
No réception 
 
An eligible person requests but receives nothing or only a part of what was requested 
because of: 
o giving up the request 
o disagreement on the offer 
o finds an arrangement with the service provider 
o lack of attention to the procedures  
o dysfunction in of the service provider 
o discrimination 
 
                                                 
1 Note that this typology is used by various institutions in France and abroad. The Canadian department for the 
evaluation of ‘Human Resources’ and development of competencies used it in its synthesis of a vast set of 
Canadian and other official reports and academic studies on participation in social programmes or take-up of 
benefits (“Participation aux programmes” Report, RHDC Canada, September 2009. 
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 Apart from its explanatory purposes, the main contribution of this framework is that it 
highlights the possibility of deliberate non-take-up. In that case, NTU no longer seems to be 
an incident due to some degree to chance, notably in the application process (no knowledge of 
the offer or problem implementing it), but rather a social relationship with the public offer 
and the institutions serving it. In particular, this NTU characterizes people who do not request 
the proposed offer. Additionally, this framework distinguishes a non-take-up not chosen and a 
chosen non-take-up. It thus enables us to question the effectiveness of the offer, as well as its 
relevance, that is, its meaning for (non) users. NTU is therefore not only a managerial issue – 
as originally thought – but also a political issue primarily associated with an issue of social 
cohesion. 
 
II. Reforms and effects in terms of NTU  
 
 Changes in the European welfare states since the late 1970s afford a global 
explanation for the situation of NTU of social rights. The increasing selectiveness of social 
welfare systems seems to be the cornerstone of current reforms within the European Union. It 
underpins the reconceptualization of the social state on the basis of three imperatives: the 
long-term sustainability of redistribution; equity between the generations that are going to live 
side-by-side in the same society tomorrow; and, finally, the transferability of social rights 
within the large European market, to accelerate the mobility of labour. 
 This selectiveness involves the establishment of a system of conditions that targets 
populations or territories and determines criteria for access to outputs, be they social benefits 
(financial benefits, rate scales, exemptions, grants) or individualized assistance. Due to the 
conditions that it imposes for obtaining access to aid, selectiveness has triggered concern 
among several social actors with regard to the difficulties that the targeted populations have in 
accessing benefits.  
 
 1. Socio-economic criteria 
 
 Socio-economic criteria generally serve to target benefits towards the poorest publics. 
Means testing is the most frequently used method for this purpose. Benefits are paid only to 
households whose income is below a certain threshold. In other cases, the amount of the aid is 
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contingent on income. Other conditions which are not linked to income also tend to 
concentrate the distribution of benefits on those families with the lowest income. Benefits 
intended for large families cater primarily for low-income households, as do benefits for 
single-parent families. When the aim is not only to direct benefits towards the poorest 
categories of the population but also to limit the number of beneficiaries of social welfare, it is 
possible to implement access criteria based on age, or to increase the duration or amount of 
contributions that have to have been paid previously in order to be eligible. But, as studies 
carried out in the UK from the 1950s have shown (Hamel, 2009), the more conditions there 
are governing access, the more likely they are to generate difficulties of access. 
 
 2. Behavioural criteria 
 
 With the development of forms of assistance aimed at making more secure those who 
have lost their entitlement to social welfare (unemployment benefits, healthcare, retirement 
pension) because they have been unemployed for too long, access to welfare is tending to 
become more short-term. The distribution of resources is selective and temporary; it depends 
on a large number of individual or family parameters that can evolve rapidly, while the 
duration of entitlement and the possibilities of cumulating several benefits are being reduced 
for budgetary reasons. The mechanisms of individuation and personal responsibility often 
become decisive. Hence, in addition to the usual criteria (income, age, family composition, 
etc.), behaviour may also be taken into account in determining eligibility and maintaining 
rights. 
 In this general logic of reform, access to social programmes and social welfare is 
increasingly contingent on duties and obligations. This applies to socio-professional insertion 
but also to other domains such as healthcare. As in the UK in the 1980s, under the policies 
and programmes to alleviate poverty and social exclusion, recipients have duties and 
obligations (Lister, 1990). The growing prevalence of this regime of conditionality is tending 
gradually to bring the models of social welfare in Europe closer together (Alber, Gilbert, 
2010), as well as profoundly altering representations of the public offer. 
 Non-take-up due to no demand arises mainly when the offer comes with conditions 
concerning the beneficiary’s behaviour, which appear to be unrealistic or inacceptable. A 
condition that requires beneficiaries to prove their autonomy and responsibility conveys 
models of self accomplishment (theorized by the US psychologist Abraham Harold Maslow). 
For some people these models are difficult to attain, for social, economic and psychological 
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reasons, as well as moral or political ones. In particular, the principle of activation, with 
everything it implies as regards commitments to meet, can be the cause of no demand due to 
self-denigration of the person’s own abilities, or to discouragement faced with the complexity 
of access, or to disagreement with the principles of the offer. 
 In these different cases, the situations of NTU seem to relate to a situation of no choice 
and to social inequalities, that is, to handicaps due to social belonging, lack of skills and an 
imposed status, all of which the offer emphasizes. This begs the question of what the effects 
are of reforms designed to introduce this regime of conditionality, especially when poverty or 
precariousness – the effects of social inequalities – undermine individuals’ self-esteem. It is 
therefore urgent to examine individuals’ confidence in themselves and in the institutions 
concerned, especially those individuals who are the worst affected by social inequalities 
(Ehrenberg, 2010). In other cases, situations of NTU due to no demand that appear to be 
chosen also call into question the effectiveness of policies that do not seem to be potential 
“solutions” for the targeted populations. 
 
III. Institutional responses to NTU 
 
 Phenomena of NTU are not totally disregarded by the public authorities. Without 
going into the history here of how they have been addressed institutionally in Europe 
(EXNOTA, 2005), we simply wish to note that they are taken into consideration in so far as 
they can help to address problems of poverty and exclusion. The causes of these public 
problems and possible solutions can be posited in relation to NTU. Hence, situations of 
poverty and exclusion could partially be explained by NTU, while solutions would depend on 
the possibility of (again) gaining the trust of populations and giving their rights (back) to 
individuals. 
 Various public actors (social security, local/regional authorities, etc.) and non-profit 
organizations (charities or specialists in a domain: housing, healthcare, employment, culture 
and recreation, etc.) use the issue of the difficulty of access to rights to reorganize their action. 
This operational approach is sometimes implemented on the basis of the three types of NTU 
presented above. In this classification the administrative approaches of NTU that seek to solve 
problems of no knowledge and no reception are distinguished; they are comprehensive 
approaches aimed at taking into account the reasons for no demand.  
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 1. Administrative approaches to address situations of no knowledge and no 
reception 
 
 Administrative approaches to address these situations are adopted primarily by the 
social welfare organizations (mainly the health insurance and family allowance funds) with a 
view to improving the effectiveness of the compulsory social benefits that they provide. In 
general, reforms have aimed primarily at facilitating take-up by populations already known or 
close to the public services concerned. In this case, improvements are made to the front office, 
that is, the ‘quality’ of reception. In other cases, so-called back office reforms have aimed to 
facilitate the access both of populations known to the organization and of those who are more 
distant. This is done essentially by proactively seeking to identify citizens’ rights through 
cross-referencing of administrative data, and then informing those citizens of their rights. 
 
 a) Reforming the front office 
 
 To cope with the practical difficulties of access and to reduce or avoid stigmatization, 
reforms have concerned the ‘material’ organization of public services, e.g. grouping services 
together into one-point services; alterations made to receive disabled or elderly persons at 
public service offices, or online procedures developed so that they do not have to go out; 
reducing queues; increasing opening hours of services; improving the comfort of the offices 
where people are received; promoting confidentiality. 
 In response to problems of NTU, the diffusion of information on benefits and services 
has also been taken into consideration. Solutions have included the creation of various 
structures responsible for disseminating information, increased opening hours of the services 
that deliver information, or the improvement of reception services. There have also been 
various actions to translate information for people of foreign origin or to provide specific aid 
for the illiterate or semi-literate.  
In addition to this dissemination of information, policies of simplification of the legal 
and administrative terminology have been crucial, especially to promote disadvantaged 
populations’ access to aid. Four main methods have been used for the purpose of 
simplification to facilitate access: grouping together procedures; eliminating procedures; 
simplifying administrative forms; and computerizing many procedures. Simplifying forms 
implies, for example, eliminating some but also changing them to make them easier to 
understand and to fill in. Administrative services have furthermore limited the number of 
documents that potential beneficiaries need to produce, and have been careful to ensure that 
application forms are easy to obtain. 
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Reforms have also aimed for more transparency. Some services have for example 
started to send applicants an acknowledgement of receipt of their application and, where 
possible, information on the probable time it will take to process it. It has been found that 
some people became anxious when they are unable to monitor the processing of their 
application, and consequently seek alternative solutions and/or advise others not to apply. 
When the processing of their application seems abnormally long, if a letter has gone astray, 
for example, they may also fail to inform the administration if their situation changes. 
 
b) Reforming the back office 
 
 Reforms have also aimed to identify individuals in situations of NTU and to inform 
them of their rights. Tools for mass identification and information have been experimented 
(Revil, 2008, 2010), as the social services are mobilized in “proactive” approaches where they 
seek out those people considered to be vulnerable to NTU. An example would be the cross-
referencing of administrative data in back offices, so that from a single point citizens can 
rapidly know what they are entitled to (and not only what aid is available), while at the same 
time expenses are pooled or reduced as some administrative processes become redundant. 
Owing to information and communication technologies (ICT), such cross-referencing makes 
it possible to identify eligible beneficiaries’ rights without them having to file an application. 
In Belgium the development of the Crossroads Bank for Social Security (CBSS) 
clearly illustrates this logic. Instituted in January 1990, this bank allows for the networking of 
data held by the social security agencies, users, and private enterprises, to simplify procedures 
and reduce the costs involved in granting and obtaining benefits and services. With this 
system, all registrations are electronic, and the forms are available on the social security 
portal. The automatic granting of social benefits is moreover one of the main objectives of the 
CBSS for the future. In the Netherlands several municipalities use software to cross-reference 
data in order to identify individuals who have not taken up one or more means-tested benefits. 
This is notably the case of the City of Amsterdam which uses a system of “automatic” access 
to those benefits under its control. A social security databank at national level, comparable to 
the Belgian bank, is also planned in the Netherlands. In France, the creation of a common 
databank of this type was launched in 2007. With the Répertoire national commun de la 
protection sociale (RNCPS), one of the objectives is to optimize the conditions of opening, 
managing and controlling social welfare beneficiaries’ rights and benefits, primarily by 
identifying beneficiaries (Hamel, 2009). 
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 2. Comprehensive approaches for taking into account the reasons for no demand 
 
 These improvements in the management of benefits facilitate knowledge on the public 
service offer and the reception of aid. They do not however improve the quality of the offer. 
Very recently in France, the Médiateur de la République (‘public mediator’) vehemently 
denounced the discriminatory consequences of the development of electronic administration 
when it disregards social inequalities in the access to and use of new modes of 
communication.  
At local level it has however been found that the squeeze on public budgets and the 
proximity of populations and voters leads more directly to questions on the utility and 
modalities of the public offer. It is then at this level of public action that questions arise on the 
reasons for a lack of interest and no demand. Answers vary widely, depending on the local 
authority and the country. Three main types of answer emerge: 
 
- An answer by the market, with the delegation to the private sector of the least-used 
benefits, when they have not been eliminated. The UK in the 1980s illustrates this use 
of the phonemenon of NTU. 
 
- An answer by the welfare system, primarily with the establishment of mechanisms of 
empowerment to give individuals their ability to meet the demands of the regime of 
conditionality in social policies. Examples include: the numerous initiatives in terms 
of ‘going towards’ and of ‘doing with’ the public, in the Netherlands and Spain 
(Baillergeau, Bellot, 2007); the development of systems of governance involving 
people in precarious situations in social programmes, based on the model of 
empowerment zones, as in the US (Bronheim, Magrab and Crowel, 1999) and Canada 
(Bernard, Potvin, 2007; Klein, 2009) – which is consistent with the recommendations 
of the Politiques Locales d’Inclusion Sociale et de Démocratie Participative and the 
United Cities and Local Governments platforms (2007); and the co-production of local 
public services for the organization of the offer and even its mode of functioning 
(Alford, 2007). 
 
- A political response, when the active participation of the targeted beneficiaries in the 
definition of the content of the proposed offer is expected. This is the case of 
temporary financial benefits, targeted at individuals who are in a situation of exclusion 
ha
ls
hs
-0
05
30
30
0,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 9
 N
ov
 2
01
0
 11 
and who decide on the use of the benefits. The aim is to help to lift them out of a given 
situation, not to assist them in the long term. Basically, the idea is to make it easier for 
individuals to take responsibility for themselves when they show that they wish to get 
out of a situation of withdrawal or exclusion. This type of policy, called ‘propulsion’ 
(Ackerman, Alstott, 1999), is intended to help beneficiaries out of difficult individual 
situations permanently. It is based on the development of several basic social policy 
instruments: cheques, vouchers, grants. In this respect, France seems to be applying 
principles (Hills, Le Grand, Piachaud, 2002) and tools (Kotlikoff, 2007) implemented 
mainly in the UK and US2. It seems to be entering into the age of do-it-yourself social 
policy (Klein, Millar, 1995), based on a model of coproduction that enables 
beneficiaries to decide for themselves (Warin, 2010). 
 
 
IV. Discussion: How to combat NTU to reduce social inequalities in 
Europe? 
  
 It seems that situations of NTU, the overriding cause of which is the increasingly 
selective nature of the social welfare system, have until now been taken into account primarily 
by administrative reforms aimed at countering NTO that is due to no knowledge and no-
reception of the public offer, but that these reforms have largely disregarded NTU that is due 
to no demand (by choice or not). This situation can probably be explained by the fact that 
these cases call into question the public offer as such, or general trends in redistribution. From 
a perspective of social cohesion, such situations should not be neglected. Measures to 
facilitate access without challenging the logic of the system of redistribution are conceivable. 
Taking NTU into account as a criterion for evaluating reforms warrants being thought 
of and equipped in relation to the European schedule, especially the end of the term set by the 
Lisbon strategy for the ‘eradication of poverty’ and the reinforcing of the open method of 
coordination (OMC) and of the new social agenda. 
The struggle against NTU can be a key objective in a new strategy of social inclusion 
(this was clearly indicated in the famous ‘Access to Social Rights in Europe’ Report 
submitted in 2002 to the Council of Europe by the group of experts chaired by Irish academic 
Mary Daly). It could also be a strong orientation in a new social agenda, with access to social 
                                                 
2 The interested reader is referred to the book by Julien Damon, recommended at the end of this paper. 
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rights as a mainstay. It is nevertheless on the reinforcement of the OMC that we now wish to 
focus.  
It is generally agreed that social policy-making must be based largely on scientific data 
and indicators common to the member states. Their use should facilitate the attainment of 
common objectives set in the framework of the OMC. 
In this perspective, would it not be feasible, for instance under the Programme for 
Employment and Social Solidarity (PROGRESS) or another similar programme, to request 
and encourage evaluative and methodological research on the effectiveness and relevance of 
policies, capable of measuring phenomena of NTU (in rates and numbers of individuals), and 
in particular of identifying the effects of the regimes of conditionality on potential 
beneficiaries’ behaviours? We know that it is possible not only to measure these phenomena, 
but also to construct – notably in the form of scores – indicators of vulnerability to NTU. 
Such tools enable the actors of policies to proactively approach the populations most exposed 
to this risk. The experience of our observatory, ODENORE, shows that this is possible: 
methods and tools can be found to attain such objectives. 
Demanding and encouraging this type of evaluative and methodological research on 
NTU would require applied programmes designed to stimulate scientific inventiveness and to 
depart from the confidentiality of studies developed for the very limited benefit of a few local 
or national actors. The PROGRESS programme – or another like it – can help to transfer 
expertise and experiences, in the framework for example of orders for scientifically validated 
methodological guides or training related to processes of social OMC. 
Evaluative and methodological research is not the only type of research concerned. It 
is also necessary to make good administrative or institutional practices known and to 
disseminate them. For instance, although the experience of the CBSS has been shown at 
European level, no real attempt has been made to turn it into a model for managing social 
rights. Progress has generally been slow in generalizing the exchange of intangible data with 
the aim of ensuring the sound application of rights and making it standard practice when the 
rules and procedures of access so allow. The cross-referencing of administrative data is 
nevertheless a promising option for detecting situations of NTU and informing individuals of 
their rights, while rationalizing the management of benefits. The computerized data cross-
referencing and searches carried out today in France to combat undue payment of benefits and 
fraud with regard to social welfare could also serve to combat NTU. The emblematic example 
of a modernized and economic administration, effective in terms of access to rights, should 
however not hide the local level. 
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Experiments undertaken on public authorities, social agencies and particular 
institutions have resolutely turned towards the struggle against NTU. In particular, we have in 
mind the initiatives aimed at constructing the content of the public offer from the “space of 
individual preferences”, with the aim of facilitating its accessibility and acceptability. It 
would be useful to identify and compare them. The exchange of good practices is an excellent 
tool to encourage the struggle against NTU through the development of local initiatives. In 
France, territorial authorities (regional, departmental or communal) are mobilized in this 
respect and are seeking to innovate. What about the situation elsewhere? 
In other words, evaluating reforms in the public sector in terms of the NTU criterion 
also means asserting, through Europe, the citizen’s protection against another fundamental 
risk: that of not being able, and sometimes willing, to access the benefits of policies designed 
to promote social cohesion and inclusion. 
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Annex: Quantified data on NTU in France, Germany, the Netherlands 
(source EXNOTA), Canada (source RDHCC) and the UK (source 
Department for Work and Pensions) 
 
 
Table 1: NTU of different categories of social welfare in France
3
 
 
Benefits References Population Data
4
 Rate of NTU Comments 
Orphan 
allowance 
replaced by 
family support 
allowance in 
1985 
CERC (1986) 
CERC (1989) 
2,000 widows 
under the age of 
60 questioned 7 
and 18 months 
after their 
husband’s death 
Ad hoc survey in 
1983 and 1984 
20 % 
Benefit not means 
tested 
Widow’s 
allowance 
CERC (1986) 
CERC (1989) 
2,000 widows 
under the age of 
60 questioned 7 
and 18 months 
after their 
husband’s death 
Ad hoc survey in 
1983 and 1984 
40 % 
(of those eligible 
when means 
tested) 
 
Reversion 
pension 
CERC (1986) 
CERC (1989) 
2,000 widows 
under the age of 
60 questioned 7 
and 18 months 
after their 
husband’s death 
Ad hoc survey in 
1983 and 1984 
16 % 
Public sector 
1 %  
Private sector 
17,5 % 
Private sector + 
under the age of 
50 28 % 
 
                                                 
3 http://ODENORE.msh-alpes.prd.fr/travaux.html 
4 B. Boisguérin, Les bénéficiaires de la couverture maladie universelle au 30 septembre 2000, Etudes et 
Résultats, 96, DREES, Ministère de la solidarité, janvier, 2001 – CERC, Le veuvage avant 60 ans, ses 
conséquences financières, 1. Les premiers mois de veuvage, Document du Centre d’Etude des Revenus et des 
Coûts (CERC), 81, 2ème trimestre, 1986 – CERC, Le veuvage avant 60 ans, ses conséquences financières, 2. La 
deuxième année de veuvage, Document du Centre d’Etude des Revenus et des Coûts (CERC), 95, 4ème trimestre, 
1989 – A. Chastand, Le ciblage des familles bénéficiaires du RMI : retour sur une erreur de mesure, Recherches 
et Prévisions, 22/23, 1991, p. 41-48 – CNAF, Prospection des bénéficiaires potentiels de l’allocation de 
logement. Note pour le Conseil d’administration de la Caisse Nationale de Allocations Familiales (CNAF) du 21 
novembre 1982 – J. Fagnani, Les mères de familles face à l’AP, Recherches et Prévisions, 40, 1995, p. 85-92 – 
A. Reinstadler, Analyse micro économique du non recours (non take up) à l’APE. Rapport pour la CNAF, 
Nancy, ADEPS, janvier 1999a ; Le non-recours à l’APE. Analyse micro-économique, Dossier d’Etude, 2, 
CNAF, novembre, 1999b ; Les causes du non-recours et du quasi-non-recours à l’allocation parentale 
d’éducation, Recherches et Prévisions, 59, 2000 – E. Renaudat, Les bénéficiaires potentiels de l'ancienne APE, 
Dossiers CAF, 4, 1986, p. 50-52 – M-O. Simon, Non-recours aux aides personnelles au logement. Enquête 
exploratoire sur la CAF du Havre, Dossier d’Etude, 12, CNAF, septembre 2000 – P. Vanlerenberghe, RMI le 
pari de l'insertion. Rapport de la commission nationale d'évaluation du RMI, Paris, La Documentation Française, 
1992. 
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Allowance from 
a 
complementary 
fund 
CERC (1986) 
CERC (1989) 
2,000 widows 
under the age of 
60 questioned 7 
and 18 months 
after their 
husband’s death 
(from a sample 
of widows under 
the age of 55) 
Ad hoc survey in 
1983 and 1984 
25 % 
(widows under 
the age of 55) 
 
Child allowance 
for education 
Renaudat 
(1986a) 
Unemployed 
mothers of at 
least 3 children 
of whom one is 
under the age of 
3 
Ad hoc survey 
on families with 
at least 3 
children, of 
whom at least 
one is under the 
age of 3 
1/3 of the 
unemployed 
eligible mothers 
do not know 
about the 
allowance and 
do not receive it 
Benefit not means 
tested 
Child allowance 
for education 
Fagnani (1995) 
Mothers of at 
least 3 children 
of whom one is 
under the age of 
3 
Ad hoc survey in 
Dec 93 – Jan 94 
Local survey 
(Yvelines) 
7.3 % 
Benefit not means 
tested 
Child allowance 
for education 
Reinstadler 
(1999a, 1999b, 
2000) 
Mothers of at 
least 2 children 
of whom one is 
under the age of 
3 
Ad hoc survey 
on 713 
individuals 
(Meurthe-et-
Moselle) 
10 % 
Benefit not means 
tested 
Minimum 
income support 
(RMI) 
Chastand (1991) 
Families (1,565) 
in 12 
départements 
Ad hoc survey 
on families who 
received family 
allowances, mid-
1989 
33 % 
- Families 
only 
- 1st year 
(develop
ment of 
the 
measure) 
Minimum 
income support 
(RMI) 
 
Vanlerenberghe 
(1992) 
UNCCAS 
survey in 6 cities 
Ad hoc survey 
on 450 
individuals (and 
cross-
referencing of 
administrative 
data) 1990 
5.2 % 
(1 to 13 % 
depending on 
the city) 
Very fragile 
method 
(Free) medical 
aid from the 
département for 
beneficiaries of 
the RMI (until 
1999 covered 
basic medical 
aid and 
complementary 
aid for primary 
healthcare) 
Boisguérin 
(2001) 
Recipients of the 
FMI 
Survey in 1999 17 %  
Medical aid 
from the 
département for 
beneficiaries of 
the RMI  
Lefèvre 
(vérifier) 
Beneficiaries of 
the RMI 
INSEE survey 
on RMI in 
1998? 
14 %  
Housing CNAF (1982) Clients of 72 Sample of 8 % to 12 % Rate of NTU 
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allowance CAF (family 
allowance 
funds) 
60,000 
individuals 
1st semester 
1982 
underestimated 
because people in 
the sample were 
already recipients 
of CAF 
allowances 
(without single 
people or single-
child families for 
example) 
Housing 
allowance 
Simon M-O 
(2000) 
People with at 
least one child 
who receive at 
least one family 
allowance (CAF 
Le Havre) 
Survey on 2,000 
individuals 
drawn from the 
CAF data. 667 
questioned 
2000 
1.4% to 2.2 % 
for people 
renting 
16 to  27 % for 
people buying 
their own home 
Under-estimation 
by exclusion 
- not 
recipients 
of CAF 
aid 
- recipients 
without 
children 
 
 
We recommend the ODENORE website to complete this presentation of NTU figures with more recent data. The following 
are some examples: 
 
The non-take-up of healthcare by workers in a precarious situation. 2009 
http://odenore.msh-alpes.fr/en/non-take-healthcare-workers-precarious-situation-final-report 
 
Resulting focus:  NTU of healthcare is found not only among workers in precarious situations. The phenomenon 
is found throughout the working population, whether the person's situation is precarious or not, but to varying 
degrees: odds ratio 2.0 (database for national health insurance: 1,137,991 consultants of the medical examination 
centres financed by health insurance). The phenomenon of NTU is associated with the same variables, 
irrespective of the population under consideration. It has characteristics which transcend the precarious or non-
precarious nature of the person's job. On the whole, NTU of healthcare is strongly associated with the absence of 
complementary health insurance and with socio-economic variables linked to the individuals' living conditions. 
The explanation for the phenomenon must therefore be sought in the individuals' social environment and more 
particularly in some of its dimensions, such as isolation, family responsibility and education. 
 
 
Non-take-up of the complementary universal health insurance (CMU-C) and the 
complementary healthcare aid (ACS). 2008 
https://odenore.msh-alpes.fr/documents/NR_CMUC_ACS_synth_sept08.pdf 
 
Resulting focus : Non-take-up of the CMU-C (complementary universal health insurance) by beneficiaries of the 
RMI (minimum income support). End 2007, for the districts of Grenoble and Vienne: 
15% of the beneficiaries of the RMI had no complementary health insurance (neither the complementary 
universal health insurance (CMU-C) nor any other insurance). Although most beneficiaries of the RMI knew 
about the CMU-C, they had only superficial knowledge and little understanding of the procedures for obtaining 
it. This was notably the case in the choice of the organization managing this benefit, which seemed to be a 
problem for the vast majority of beneficiaries. 46% of beneficiaries obtained information on the CMU-C via a 
social worker. For 65% of the beneficiaries of the RMI who answered our survey questionnaires, we can talk of a 
non-renewal of the right to the CMU-C. They had already benefited from it in the past but did not ask for it 
again. While a poor understanding of the modalities of renewal and the complexity of the system are causes for 
NTU, it is also significant that 7% of beneficiaries of the RMI said that they did not renew their CMU-C 
coverage because they encountered reluctance among doctors when they were beneficiaries of this coverage. 
Note also that 45% of the beneficiaries of the RMI in our survey said that they had given up obtaining healthcare 
over the past 12 months. 86% mentioned financial reasons.  
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Non-take-up of the ACS (complementary healthcare aid) by beneficiaries of the AAH (allowance for 
handicapped adults). In April 2008, for the district of Grenoble: 75% of the beneficiaries of the AAH had 
complementary health insurance. 90% of them had not asked for complementary healthcare aid (ACS) to finance 
a part of their complementary health insurance contributions. NTU of the ACS on a massive scale by 
beneficiaries of the AAH is primarily explained by a significant lack of information on this aid. 71% of the 
respondents to our questionnaire survey had no information and many of them had never heard about the ACS. 
Even those beneficiaries who had complementary health insurance and could therefore rapidly benefit from a 
reduced contribution did not ask for this aid because they were unaware of it. Note also that most of the legal 
guardians who answered the questionnaire said they were not aware of this assistance. Of the beneficiaries who 
were unaware of the ACS, 7% had not taken it up because they thought that the level of their income did not 
entitle them to it, and 4% thought that it would not be enough to pay for complementary health insurance 
coverage. 
NTU of the CMU-C by beneficiaries of the API (allowance for single parents): 18% of beneficiaries of the API 
had no complementary health insurance (neither CMU-C nor anything else). 
 
 
Benefits and aid linked to the RMI (minimum income support). Analysis of under-use 
among beneficiaries of the RMI in the 25-34 age-group. 2007 
http://odenore.msh-alpes.fr/en/content/benefits-and-aid-linked-rmi-minimum-income-support-analysis-under-
use-among-beneficiaries-rm 
 
Resulting focus: The respondents take up few benefits and aid linked to the RMI. 50% of the answers refer to a 
lack of awareness and therefore to NTU of benefits and aid. Of the remaining 50%, 20% concern deliberate NTU 
(real or supposed awareness of entitlements). Some of the respondents knowingly refuse aid for various reasons 
(stigmatization, weak advantage, complexity of the process, etc.) 
The declared advantage varies considerably from one type of aid to another, but very little between territories. 
Beneficiaries of the RMI who have an 'insertion contract' are more likely to take up related aid. 
 
Non-take-up of insertion contracts. Results of a questionnaire survey on beneficiaries of 
the RMI in Isère. 2005 
http://odenore.msh-alpes.fr/en/content/non-take-insertion-contracts-results-questionnaire-survey-beneficiaries-
rmi-is%C3%A8re 
 
Resulting focus: Over 17% of the respondents explained non-contractualization only by a lack of information. 
But 21% also said that they did not count on insertion contracts for finding a job because they wanted a "real 
job" (10%), "to get off the RMI as quickly as possible" (6%) or to "manage another way for work" (5%). A 
dominant profile emerged: that of a man or woman, fairly young, often living alone, recently registered for the 
RMI, generally with few qualifications or skilled work experience. In many respects their explanations relate to 
the characteristics of disqualifying poverty, marked by the fear of unemployment and the precariousness of jobs, 
anxiety about exclusion and safety, yet at the same time dependence on social services. 
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Table 2: Non-take-up of social aid (minimum income support: Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt HLU) 
in Germany
5
 
 
Year of 
survey 
Year of 
publication 
Sources
6
 Methods Rate of NTU References
7
 
1963 1981 EVS quantitative 61 % Hauser et al. 
1969 1981 EVS quantitative 45 % Hauser et al. 
1973 1981 EVS quantitative 48 % Hauser et al. 
1978 1978 
1000 
 
quantitative/ 
qualitative 50 % 
Bujard/Lange 
 
1973 1981 EVS quantitative 33 % 
Transfer-Enquête-
Kommission 
1979 1981 
25000 
households 
quantitative/ 
qualitative 
48 % Hartmann 
1983 1990 EVS quantitative 30 % Hauser/Semrau 
1991 1998 SOEP quantitative 50 % Neumann/Hertz 
1993 2000 EVS quantitative 62.7 % Riphahn 
1995 1998 SOEP quantitative 52.3 % Neumann/Hertz 
1996 2000 SOEP quantitative 63.1 % Kayser/Frick 
1999 2002 NIEP quantitative 33 % Engels 
1995 2002 Income Survey quantitative 50 % Behrendt 
2000 2002 NIEP quantitative 34.6 % Engels 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Réseau Thématique Européen EXNOTA, German periodic report, décembre 2003. 
6 EVS : Enquête sur les revenus et les dépenses des ménages ; SOEP : Panel socio-économique ; NIEP : Panel 
des ménages à bas revenus. 
7 H. Hartmann, Sozialhilfebedürftigkeit und ”Dunkelziffer der Armut“. Bericht über das Forschungsprojekt zur 
Lage potentiell Sozialhilfeberechtigter. Band 98 der Schriftenreihe des Bundesministers für Jugend, Familie und 
Gesundheit, Stuttgart, 1981 – R. Hauser, H. Cremer-Schäfer, U. Nouvertné, Armut, Niedrigeinkommen und 
Unterversorgung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bestandsaufnahme und sozialpolitische Perspektiven, 
Frankfurt a. M., 1981 – O. Bujard, U. Lange, Theorie und Praxis der Sozialhilfe. Zur Situation der 
einkommensschwachen alten Menschen, Stuttgart, 1978 – Transfer-Enquête-Kommission, Das Transfersystem in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission zur Ermittlung des Einflusses 
staatlicher Transfereinkommen auf das verfügbare Einkommen der privaten Haushalte, Stuttgart, 1981 – R. 
Hauser, P. Semrau, Zur Entwicklung der Einkommensarmut von 1963 bis 1986, Sozialer Fortschritt  39 (1), 
1990, p.  27-36 – U. Neumann, M. Hertz, Verdeckte Armut in Deutschland, Forschungsbericht im Auftrag der 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Frankfurt a. M., 1998 –  R-T. Riphahn, Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The take-
up of Social Assistance Benefits, Review of Income and Wealth, 47 (3), 2001, p. 379-398 – H. Kayser, J. Frick, 
Take It or Leave It: (Non-)Take-Up Behavior of Social Assistance in Germany, DIW Discussion Papers No. 210, 
Berlin, 2000 – D. Engels, Nicht-Inanspruchnahme zustehender Sozialhilfeleistungen. In Sell S. (ed.). Armut als 
Herausforderung – Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven der Armutsforschung und Armutsberichterstattung, 
Berlin, 2002, p. 264-285 – Ch. Behrendt, Do means-tested transfers alleviate poverty? Evidence on Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom from the Luxembourg Income Study, Journal of European Social Policy, 10 
(1), 2000, p. 23-41. 
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Table 3: Non-take-up of different categories of social benefits in the Netherlands
8
 
Benefits References9 Level Methods Rate of NTU 
Housing allowance 
Lucassen, Premius 
(1977) KWIZ 
(2002) 
Local/National 
Administrative data 
and declarative 
inquiries 
7% - 56% 
General social welfare (also 
means tested) 
Bijsterveld (1975) 
Buddemeijer, Van 
Engers (1976); 
Vrooman, 
Asselberghs (1994) 
Local/National Declarative inquiries 16% - 27% (1) 
Local exemptions 
Groen, Konings 
(1989) Oorschot, 
Smolenaars (1992); 
KWIZ (2002) 
Local 
Administrative data 
and declarative 
inquiries 
16% -72% 
 
Benefits References Target groups Sources 
Rate of 
NTU 
Konsumenten Kontact 
(1989) 
Low income 
Postal survey on members of 
the FNV union 
54% 
Van der Werf (1992) 
Recipients of minimum income 
support in Hengelo 
Survey on 421 individuals 50% 
Van Oorschot, 
Smolenaars (1992) 
Clients of the social welfare 
services of Rotterdam and 
Nijmegen 
Social welfare services of 
Rotterdam (n=269) and 
Nijmegen (252) 
63% / 
53% 
Van Oorschot, 
Smolenaars (1993) 
The elderly in Rotterdam and 
Nijmegen 
Sample of independent 
individuals over the age of 65 
in Rotterdam (n=470) and 
Nijmegen (n=899) 
50% / 
72% 
S
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Enbersen,  Snel (1998-
2001) 
“The poor” in Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam 
Sample of 216 individuals 62% 
 
                                                 
8 European Thematic Network EXNOTA, Dutch  periodic report, December 2003. 
9 Quirinus Marinus van Bijsterveldt, Een sociale voorziening en haar cliënten, een onderzoek naar de 
bijstandverlening aan vrouwelijke gezinshoofden (A social provision and its users, research into the provision of 
social assistance to female bread-earners), Tilburg, Instituut voor Sociaal-wetenschappelijk Onderzoek van de 
Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg, 1975 – C. Buddemeier, R. van Engers,  Jongeren in uitkering bij de sociale 
dienst (Young people with an social assistance), Amsterdam, Gemeentelijke sociale Dienst, 1976 – KWIZ, 
Armoede in Amsterdam: Over doelgroepen in het lokaal sociaal beleid, instrumenten voor 
inkomensondersteuning en participatiebevordering en het gebruik en niet-gebruik van deze voorzieningen, 
Groningen,  2002 – C-T-J. Lucassen, H. Priemus, Individuele huursubsidie, evaluatie van een instrument van 
volkshuisvestingsbeleid (Individual rental subsidy, evaluation of a policy tool in the field of social housing), 
Gravenhage, R.I.W., Instituut voor Volkshuisvestingsonderzoek, 1977 – Wim van Oorschot, Take it or leave it, a 
study of non-take-up of social security benefits, Tilburg, 1994 – Wim van Oorschot, Onbenutte rechten: het niet-
gebruik van sociale zekerheid onder Rotterdamse bijstandsontvangers (Unused rights: the non-take-up of social 
security of social assistance clients in Rotterdam), Rotterdam, Sociale zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1992 – Wim 
van Oorschot, P. Kolkhuis Tanke, Niet-gebruik van sociale zekerheid: feiten, theorieën, onderzoeksmethoden: 
een overzicht van de stand van zaken in binnen- en buitenland (Non-take-up of social security: facts, theories, 
research methods: an overview of the state of affairs in the Netherlands and abroad), Den Haag, Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989 – J-C. Vrooman, K-T-M. Asselberghs, De gemiste bescherming, niet-
gebruik van sociale zekerheid door bestaansonzekere huishoudens (The missed protection, non-take-up of social 
security by households in state of uncertainty), Rijswijk, COSZ/Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1994. 
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Table 4: Rate of take-up of Canadian social programmes – RHDCC evaluations 
(excerpts from the Technical Report, 14 July 2009: 22) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: The take-up of the main income-related benefits in Great Britain for the 
financial year 2008-09 
Key results for 2008-09. Department for Work and Pensions 
http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=irb_arc 
 
     
 
Benefits 
 
 
Take-up by caseload 
 
Take-up by expenditure 
Income Support & Employment and 
Support Allowance 
Take-up between 78% and 90% by 
caseload, compared with between 
78% and 88% in 2007-08 
Take-up between 85% and 94% by 
expenditure, compared with between 
85% and 93% in 2007-08 
Pension Credit Take-up between 62% and 73% by 
caseload, compared with between 
61% and 70% in 2007-08  
Take-up between 71% and 81% by 
expenditure, compared with between 
70% and 78% in 2007-08  
Housing Benefit  Take-up between 77% and 86% by 
caseload, compared with between 
80% and 87% in 2007-08  
 
Take-up between 82% and 90% by 
expenditure, compared with between 
85% and 91% in 2007-08  
 
Council Tax Benefit  
 
Take-up between 63% and 70% by 
caseload, compared with between 
62% and 68% in 2007-08  
Take-up between 65% and 73% by 
expenditure, compared with between 
63% and 70% in 2007-08  
Jobseeker’s Allowance (Income-
Based)  
Take-up between 47% and 59% by 
caseload, compared with between 
52% and 60% in 2007-08 
Take-up between 49% and 63% by 
expenditure, compared with between 
54% and 65% in 2007-08 
 
 
Report title 
Rate Assessment 
of the rate 
Prestations de l’assurance-emploi (AE) en 
matière d’aide à la prise en charge des 
membres de la famille (2006) 
Possible calculation of the rate of participation: 
1.7% or situated between 28.5% and 21.7% (if more 
reasonable estimate of the eligible population) 
Lower than 
expected 
Évaluation sommative des produits et 
services d’information sur le marché du 
travail de RHDCC (2005) 
Rate of take-up: 68.8% (IMT services without 
advice). Rate of take-up variable depending on types 
of service (employment office: close to 60%; 
community information, 8.1%; individual 
advice/counseling: 2.8%)  
n.d. 
Évaluation sommative des prestations 
parentales de l’assurance-emploi (2005) 
Participation rate 48.8% (against 44.4% under the 
previous programme in 2001) 
Relatively low 
Examen des ententes de développement des 
ressources humaines autochtones – Synthèse 
des constatations (2004) 
Possible estimate of the rate of participation over 
three years: 31% (double counting possible) 
High 
Évaluation formative du Programme 
canadien de prêts aux étudiants (2004) 
The percentage of beneficiary students rose from 
30% in 1990-1991 to 38% in 1999-2000. The 
eligible population is not specified; it is probably 
smaller than the proportion of students, thus 
increasing the rate of participation. We assume here 
that this is the rate of participation in the 
programme. 
n.d. 
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